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Abstract: Drawing on early sociological analyses of how power and intergroup conflicts can 
affect the development of modern economies, this paper investigates how the recent Global 
Crisis has affected the stratification of the US society. The paper argues that the consumerist 
society has reinforced the historical stratification of social identities with white men in high-
paid, high-social status managerial and financial occupations at the top, and black women in 
low-paid, low-status service occupations at the bottom. This paper calls for a deconstruction 
of the neo-liberal individual into a unique combination of identities in a stratified capitalist 
society in order to reveal how social stratification has evolved during the Global Crisis. The 
paper finally concludes on the importance of heterogeneous identities in reflecting the 
diversity of societal and economic interests in order to address the issue of financial stability 





A feature of consumerist societies is to celebrate the nature of individuals as atomistic entities 
by promoting the values of “personal improvement and dignity, self-definition, attaining the 
respectable social standard”. These are the words of the distinguished scholar Zygmund 
Bauman (1982: 181) and are part of his prolific work, which undermines the relevance of 
neo-classical economic theories in explaining modern human interactions. In the neoclassical 
approach to economics, individualization is in effect linked to free-market ideology, which 
celebrates the actions and fulfilment of an atomistic individual who does not belong to any 
class, gender, race, or age group. Sociological analyses have, however, widely shown the 
importance of power, intergroup conflicts and social identity in shaping not only economic 
outcomes, but also economic theories and policy-making.  
Drawing on the early sociological work of Bauman (1972, 1982) on the role of power and 
intergroup conflicts in the capitalist society, this paper investigates the nature of the dominant 
demographic group in the US society, namely white men, its existence and its persistence 
over time during the financialisation period and beyond. Several recent works across the 
social sciences have suggested that the exacerbation of financial earnings excesses has gone 
hand in hand with deep structural changes in modern economies that have led first to the 
financial crisis in 2007/2008 and then to the Great Recession, i.e. the so-called Global 
Economic Crisis or Global Crisis (GC) for short (Knights and Tullberg 2012; Arestis, Charles 
and Fontana 2014).  
A number of those contributors have suggested that inequality, especially in the US and UK, 
was one of the root causes of the GC. In this regard, the most important distributional factor 
was the concentration of earnings in the financial sector. Furthermore, as argued in Arestis 
and Karakitsos (2013), inequality was promoted by another main cause of the crisis, namely 
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financial liberalisation, which, through deregulation, enabled the household sector to increase 
its debt substantially.1 Financial liberalisation and inequality helped to develop the third root 
cause of the crisis, namely ‘financial innovation’ (or ‘financial architecture’). Inequality and 
financial liberalisation promoted the enhancement of the ‘shadow banking’ (or ‘parallel 
banking sector’), especially after the repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act in 1999, which 
would borrow on a short-term basis and lend on a long-term basis, mainly for mortgage 
purposes; thereby creating what is now known as sub-prime mortgages. In addition, the 
shadow banking engineered a new activity that relied on interlinked securities, the 
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), mainly emerging from and closely related to the 
subprime mortgage market. The sale of CDOs to international investors made the US housing 
bubble a global problem, and provided the transmission mechanism for the contagion of the 
financial crisis to the rest of the world. As long as long-term interest rates were higher than 
short-term rates of interest, the new financial architecture was flourishing. Those activities 
were also helped by international imbalances, monetary policy of low interest rates and the 
role of credit-rating agencies. The collapse of the housing market and the reversal of interest 
rates, with long-term rates falling below short-term ones, by August 2007 promoted the 
freezing of the shadow banking in the US and the collapse of the CDOs market. The collapse 
of the subprime and CDOs markets spilled over into the real economy through the credit 
crunch and collapsing equity markets. All this then led to the freezing of the interbank 
lending market after August 2007, and promoted the GC, namely an international financial 
crisis over the period 2007/2008 followed by a significant recession, the ‘Great Recession’.  
Since 2007, financial authorities have promised to introduce reforms to achieve financial 
stability (Arestis and Karakitsos 2013: Ch. 9 ). However, the homogeneity and hegemony of 
group identities and related interests of the financial actors and institutions have not been 
challenged since, which means that the same policy and practices are likely to be sustained 
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beyond the crisis, and hence raises doubt on the effectiveness of future reforms in the 
financial sector. As such, this paper argues that the persistent social stratification of the 
occupational hierarchy, which has played a prominent role in the process leading to the 
financial crisis, is also likely to be one of the direct consequences during and beyond the GC, 
unless the issues of identity, power and intergroup conflict are taken seriously by policy 
makers. 
The paper advocates the need to deconstruct the neo-liberal individual into separate social 
identities such as class, race, and gender on a hierarchical and evolutionary basis in order to 
explain the evolution and persistence of inequality over the last few decades (see also, on the 
ontology of fear and its relationship to neo-liberalism, Wrenn 2014). For this purpose, the 
analysis starts by reviewing the experience of gender, race and ethnic groups in the wake of 
the crisis of the summer 2007. Building on from this, the discussion then proceeds to show 
how the existence and survival of a dominant group at the intersection of class, race, ethnicity 
and gender depends on the sustainability of their learned patterns of expectations and 
behaviour, and how such patterns played a major role on rising inequality during the GC. In 
effect, the historical memory has set in motion the mechanisms of power relationships 
specific to the US society (Arestis, Charles and Fontana 2014; Darity 1989, 2005) in order to 
sustain white men in managerial and financial occupations at the top of the US stratification 
process. Finally, the last part of the paper discusses how these mechanisms of power 
relationships are being sustained in the GC and beyond, and offers some insights for a set of 






From Growth to Crisis: Capital Accumulation and Inequality 
According to the early sociological work of Bauman on the role of power and intergroup 
conflicts in the capitalist society, modern societies are not egalitarian by nature since the free 
movement of capital means that capital tends to accumulate in the hands of a historically 
dominant group, which leads to rising inequality vis-à-vis other groups. In economic theory, 
this process is justified by the Pareto criterion which leads Bauman to argue that Western 
capitalist societies drive on the utopia of equality where “as long as one could indeed get 
richer without making those already rich poorer, the egalitarian spur made the wheels of 
expanding economy rotate faster, without unduly straining their capitalist axis” (Bauman 
1982: 182). At the time of these writings, Western societies have indeed experienced rising 
levels of inequality, which have gone hand in hand with the financialisation process of 
modern economies. In the literature ‘financialisation’ has been referred to as the dominance 
of ‘shareholder value’ as a mode of governance, or the rising popularity of market-based over 
bank-based financial systems, or simply the increasing economic and political power of the 
‘rentier’ class who derives its income from the ownership of financial property rather than 
from productive activities (Krippner 2005). Hence, the general meaning of financialisation is 
understood here to refer to the growing weight of financial motives and actors in the 
operation of modern economies, both at the national and international level, from the early 
1980s until today.2 
Several studies have tried to capture the salient features of the financialisation process and the 
role of rising inequality over the last three decades in terms of its contribution to the GC (e.g. 
Perugini et al. 2015, Stockhammer 2015). In effect, rising inequality makes the financial 
sector more fragile and vulnerable to systematic failures, with deleterious effects on the entire 
society. One view suggests that income inequality is due to recent changes in the global 
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terms-of-trade, moving away from low-income sectors toward high-income sectors such as 
the financial sector (Kuznets 1955, Galbraith 2011). From this perspective, financialisation is 
a global phenomenon, and this phenomenon has led to a growing power of financial actors 
and institutions. Once the momentum of capital accumulation is launched, inequality is 
exacerbated between those retaining capital in their hands and those not enjoying the fruits of 
economic growth. Financialisation meant that there was a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between capital accumulation and rising income inequalities, serving the interests  of the elite 
of rentiers. 
In the US, the rise in inequality has led to a decline in savings and an increase in household 
debt as the relatively poor sought to maintain their (relative) living standards. The co-
existence of rising income inequality and (relatively) constant living standards was 
maintained at the expense of an unsustainable credit boom, which at the end helped to 
promote the GC (Fitoussi and Saraceno 2010, Fitoussi and Stiglitz 2009). In 2007, the crisis 
hit the US and many advanced and less advanced economies, and led to a decisive response 
by policy makers around the world in order to save the banking and financial sectors from 
illiquidity and insolvency problems. These policy interventions were defended on the grounds 
that the smooth working of the banking and financial sectors was  an essential component for 
the existence and sustainability of modern capitalist societies. As a result of the policy 
interventions, the government budget positions of many countries in the world deteriorated 
dramatically, and this in turn led to a contagious spread of austerity measures. 
According to Crotty (2012), the ‘great austerity war’ should be the burden of the culprits of 
the crisis, by increasing taxation on the rich and powerful political groups of the US society, 
rather than being the burden of its victims, the poor and middle-class who suffer the side-
effects of spending cuts in healthcare, education and benefits. Together with fewer jobs and 
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income opportunities in the wake of the crisis, vulnerable groups are likely to experience a 
shrinking of their social safety net with the withdrawal of the state. The early writing of 
Bauman (1982) describes how power and intergroup conflicts can inform the effects 
associated with economic and social crises: 
pauperisation becomes the fate of the groups which are to a larger degree, if not 
fully, dependent on the increasingly depressed areas of social life [...] Mothers 
without husbands will be definitely cut off from the labour market by the 
disappearance of nursery schools and crèches. Old people will become the main 
victims of the shrinking welfare offices. Ethnic minorities, first to lose their jobs 
in rising unemployment, will in all probability suffer a cumulative impact of the 
bias with all its ramifications. Families with incomes too small or too irregular to 
deserve a mortgage loan will be easy prey for the cruelty and greed of slum 
landlords (Bauman 1982: 187). 
The GC illustrates the relevance of power and intergroup conflicts in informing the actual 
socio-economic outcomes of the 2007-2008 international financial crisis on the social groups 
mentioned above, namely single mothers, the elderly and ethnic minorities.3 In effect, 
deconstructing the neo-classical atomistic individual into multiple identities allows a better 
understanding of the un-egalitarian impact of the GC on these groups. Firstly, single mothers 
who maintain their families in the US have experienced a surge in unemployment since 2009. 
In effect, the unemployment rate of single mothers was around 7% in April 2009, and rose 
above 12% in December 2012. In the meantime, the unemployment rate of married men 
dropped from 7% to less than 5%, respectively (Seguino 2013). Whether this is the sole 
factor linked to government spending cuts and its associated pressure on childcare is not 
clear. However, recent evidence on the time allocation of married mothers in the US shows 
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that married women have substituted paid work for unpaid work during the 2007-2009 
recession (Berik and Kongar 2013). Fathers’ paid work hours also declined, but their time 
was reallocated to leisure rather than childcare. Therefore, the pattern of gender inequality in 
childcare seems to be reinforced in hardship. 
Secondly, the effect of the GC on the elderly is associated with the ‘austerity war’ during and 
beyond the crisis, and with a smaller welfare state in general. For instance, in the UK context, 
Grimshaw and Rubery (2012) review the potential effects of the Coalition Government plans 
of spending cuts on the society, and in particular the outsourcing of public services, such as 
healthcare, to the private sector. However, even prior to the full implementation of the cuts, 
they show that the Coalition Government “has had to guarantee care provision for older 
people affected by the bankruptcy of a national chain of care home providers, and the 
government regulator, the Care Quality Commission, has had to accept part of the blame for 
evidence of poor quality care offered by the private sector” (Grimshaw and Rubery 2012: 
121). Here, the general issue of care framed in a free-market ideology is that care is a long-
term investment whose cross-generational rewards are not necessarily consistent with the 
intrinsic values of short-term capital accumulation. 
Thirdly, the effect of the GC on ethnic minorities comes through the fact that the latter face 
fewer job and income opportunities. At a time of slower growth, it would make economic 
sense for employers to hire the cheaper and more flexible part of the labour force, i.e. women 
and ethnic minorities. However, Charles and Fontana (2011) show that, at the heart of the 
financial crisis between 2008 and 2009, white employers in the US favoured white workers at 
the expense of the young, female, black and Asian workers. The traditional minorities of the 
part-time labour force, the young, female, blacks and Asians have all experienced lower 
growth rates in part-time employment than white men and Hispanics. In times of rising 
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uncertainty, it seems that the dominant white group is left with their identity as the only 
certainty, which in turn triggers a Darwinian survival strategy of their group by hiring an 
increasing number of whites on part-time contracts. 
Ethnic minorities have also suffered the cumulative impact of being poor family households 
who became easy targets for ‘predatory’ loans, namely loans with unsustainable terms. 
Dymski (2010) points out that predatory lending has surged in the US since the early 1990s. 
In the consumer stage of capitalism, the foreclosure crisis in the US is the outcome of a group 
conflict between poor ethnic minorities seeking higher living and housing standards, and the 
financiers seeking higher social standards. The last thirty years have indeed been 
characterised by the evolution of financial exclusion of poor and minority households into 
their financial exploitation. Rugh and Massey (2010) estimate the effect of residential racial 
segregation on foreclosures in the US, controlling for factors such as housing price inflation, 
overbuilding, excessive subprime lending, and failure to assess creditworthiness. The results 
show that foreclosures are concentrated in areas with large racial differentials in subprime 
lending. As expected, foreclosures concern essentially Hispanic and black home owners in 
metropolitan areas, especially in the West and Midwest. They conclude that segregation is 
both a cause and consequence of the housing crisis. 
In sum, the most vulnerable groups during the GC in the US, namely women, black and 
Hispanic groups, and the elderly being cared for, pay the price of financial liberalisation and 
deregulation, and the consequent rising of inequality over the past 35 years. The GC is 
effectively the outcome of the intersection of these different rising trends, inequality on the 
one side, and financial liberalisation/deregulation and financial exploitation, on the other side 
(Tridico 2012). In a highly financialised society like the US, an individual with several 
segregated identities, such as being an old, black, woman working in care occupations, would 
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mean a much higher probability of cumulative deprivation during economic downturns. This 
outcome is consistent with the main tenets of the stratification and intersectionality literature 
(e.g. Darity 1989, 2005, Darity and Williams 1985, hooks 1981) explaining that historically 
race and gender have been used as a convenient group identification feature for stratifying the 
economy in terms of access to resources and opportunities. In addition, as argued by Arestis, 
Charles and Fontana (2014) group identities and social norms, i.e. the established set of social 
practices and ideals that shape the behaviour of people, are malleable over time. Changing 
macroeconomic conditions do affect group identities and social norms, and they can fuel 
intergroup conflict. The GC, characterised by intense competition over prized and scarce 
resources such as jobs or access to care, is a case in point (see also, Seguino 2010, Seguino 
and Heintz 2012). 
  
Cumulative Identities in the US: Class, Race, and Gender Stratification 
At the other end of the stratification spectrum, the rise of a dominant group reflects the 
specific institutional framework in which financialisation takes place. Lapavitsas and Powell 
(2013) show that  financialisation in  advanced economies varied according to their 
institutional characteristics. For example, over the past thirty years, households in Japan, 
Germany and France tended to have a higher proportion of their savings in the form of 
deposits rather than market-based assets; the latter was more prominent in  the case of the US 
and British households, whose savings were more prone to market volatility. However, a 
common trend across these five countries is that household indebtedness has increasingly 
been in the form of mortgage debt rather than consumer debt. Lapavitsas and Powell (2013) 
also show that this trend can be explained by the change in the lending structure of Western 
banks. In effect, since the 2000s loans were increasingly made to the non-productive sector of 
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the economy, i.e. finance, insurance and real-estate. As a consequence, the portfolios of both 
households and banks assets became increasingly exposed to the price volatility of financial 
assets. This increasing exposure was facilitated by the globalisation and increasing speed of 
financial interactions helped by advances in e-technologies: “rather than homogenizing the 
human condition, the technological annulment of temporal/spatial distances tends to polarize 
it” (Bauman 1998: 18). This human polarization has essentially reflected the growing gap 
between non-financial and financial activities.  
Since the early 1980s, the US economy has witnessed a shift of income away from the labour 
share of national income towards an increase in the capital share of national income, and 
more specifically towards the profit share in the financial sector (Palley 2013).The rising 
power of finance has in turn led to the rise of a dominant group at the intersection of class, 
race and gender. Starting first with  class, class stratification can be articulated on an 
occupational basis,4 and it will be considered as such for the purpose of this study. In a 
globalised society, “you can tell one kind of society from another by the dimensions along 
which it stratifies its members, and, like all other societies, the postmodern, consumer society 
is a stratified one. Those “high up” and “low down” are plotted in a society of consumers 
along the lines of mobility—the freedom to choose where to be” (Bauman 1999: 40). If the 
freedom of choice is the prime value of market liberalisation, people who are free to choose 
where to be and have easy access to financially-rewarding occupations are part of the 
dominant group of modern societies. In the age of globalisation, Bauman (2011) argues that 
managerial and financial occupations have become the dominant class of the postmodern 
society. He further argues that the nature of managerial occupational itself has evolved to 
reflect the change of society from a productive society, where the managerial role used to be 
in terms of controlling the labour force, to consumerist modern times where the new 
managerial role promotes flexible and independent work. 
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The search of a dominant class in a given society depends to a large extent on the historical 
power structure of this society. In the search for the ‘next dominant class’, Bauman argues 
that “[w]hatever class is found, it is defined in the same way: the way dictated by historical 
memory of a specific historical form of class denomination” (Bauman 1982: 27). The issue of 
race is particularly interesting given the US history. Historically, the power structure between 
labour and capital in the US had been according to skin-colour, whereby whites have 
ownership of the means of production, while the bulk of non-white minorities are part of the 
labour force. As the society evolves from a productive to a consumerist type , financialisation 
reflects this evolution and Arestis, Charles and Fontana (2014) show that the same racial 
division is sustained and exacerbated. 
In the US context, Arestis, Charles and Fontana (2013) have highlighted two striking features 
of the financialisation period that are often ignored by economists and policy makers alike. 
First, they uncover a growing wage premium for individuals working in managerial and 
financial occupations. Secondly, they show that this so-called finance wage premium is not 
equally distributed among all main demographic groups active in the US labour market. In 
particular, it is shown that white men and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic men have taken an 
increasing share of this wage premium at the expense of black men, white women, and 
Hispanic women. On the basis of these results, they conclude that financialisation has been 
neither race nor gender neutral, and that it has favoured white men in managerial and 
financial occupations. 
Charles (2011) also shows that once the 2007 financial crisis hit the US economy, white 
identity preferences remain dominant in the labour market. The black group ends up at the 
bottom of the stratification process, whether it is in terms of losing their jobs first at the time 
of the crisis, or in terms of not receiving a similar wage premium than the white and Hispanic 
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groups in managerial and financial occupations. Regardless of the level of uncertainty in the 
economic environment, the black group is segregated across the occupational spectrum. This 
is consistent with Rugh and Massey (2010) mentioned in the previous section, but also with 
Lacy (2012) who looked at the foreclosure rates of the black group by level of income. The 
findings show that the foreclosure rate of borrowers from the black group is the highest 
amongst low-income, but remains at the same level, around 10 percent, also for high-income 
borrowers. The foreclosure rate of borrowers from the Hispanic group is around 7 percent in 
the low-income group and gradually goes up to 15 percent in the high-income group. The 
Asian group shows a similar increasing trend. Finally, the foreclosure rate of borrowers from 
the white group is around 6 percent in the low-income group and goes down to 4 percent in 
the high-income group. The association of class and race, therefore, leads to dissimilar 
outcomes depending on the specific race considered, with the black group at the bottom of 
the racial stratification. 
The last element of stratification analysed here is gender. Similarly to race, gender is a social 
identity which is subject to power relationships and stereotypes. Blumer (1954) has pointed 
out that prejudice as a sense of group position could go a long way to explain gender 
discrimination and racial segregation (see, on the latter, Allport 1954). Braunstein (2008) 
shows that gender discrimination and its effect on economic growth is an instructive context 
for understanding that economic actors exercise power and collective action with the goal of 
creating and/or enhancing social norms that are costly for the society as a whole, but 
advantageous for a particular group.5 Among other things, this means that in the labour 
market, employers may indeed have identity preferences regarding which group to promote 
(the well-known Glass-ceiling effect), which group to hire - given that certain occupations are 
socially perceived to be for some skin-colour, gender, or even age groups - or which group to 
fire first in times of rising uncertainty. 
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Finally, the particularity of the gender identity could also be related to the foundations of 
modernity, if one accepts Weber’s view on the birth of modernity. In effect, Weber’s view of 
modernity is that it was born out of the separation between the family household, based on 
the moral standards of caring and sharing, and the business enterprise, based on efficiency 
and profitability (Weber 1905). Gender stereotypes often associate occupations related to care 
and personal service to ‘female’ jobs, while occupations related to profitability and 
efficiency, including managerial and financial occupations, tend to be perceived as ‘male’ 
jobs. Hence, the Global Crisis is also a crisis of the moral standards of caring and sharing; 
sharing the fruits of growth during the financialisation process beyond managerial and 
financial occupations, and caring for the vulnerable groups of society who are left 
impoverished during the crisis.  
 
Financial Actors and Institutions: Sustaining the Norm During and Beyond the Global 
Crisis 
Policy Reforms in the Financial Sector since 2007 
Following the financial crisis of August 2007 and related Great Recession, the goal of 
financial stability has emerged as one of the main priorities of central banks around the 
world. Financial stability means a strict control of the workings of financial markets, such 
that financial institutions and actors become socially and economically useful to the economy 
as a whole and to the productive economy in particular. Similarly, banks should serve the 
needs of their customers rather than provide short-term gains for shareholders and huge 
profits for themselves. In this regard, a relevant US proposal is what was initially known as 
the Volcker Rule6, which was signed into law on 21 July 2010, and became the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010. This is a lengthy rule with the relevant elements to this contribution being as 
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follows: (i) eliminate proprietary investments, i.e. banks should not be allowed to use insured 
deposits for the purposes of own trading operations; (ii) prohibit ownership of hedge funds by 
banks (in the final version of the Act banks would be allowed to hold proprietary investments 
of 3 percent of their core capital); (iii) no financial firm should be allowed to become ‘too big 
to fail’, i.e. size matters;  (iv) the end of taxpayer bailouts, whereby the legislation grants 
government the power to wind down failing institutions, not just banks, if they threaten the 
financial system;  (v) the introduction of a new Office of Credit Ratings the aim of which is 
supervision of the Credit Rating Agencies. 
The financial sector, and the Financial Services Forum (FSF) in particular, which represents 
18 US top banks, has been critical of the Dodd-Frank Act. The main critique is that the Act 
puts jobs at risk, damage US competitiveness and might even threaten growth in the US 
economy. Supervision should be the way to tackle problems in the financial sector with the 
most frequently used argument against the proposals is that they are by far too complicated. 
Against this view, it could be argued that the Dodd-Frank proposals cannot be more 
complicated than the creation of the Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), which was one 
of the main causes of the 2007 financial crisis. Indeed, compared to CDOs, the new proposals 
are delightfully simple. In fact, this Act may not be the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, but it is 
the most sweeping and wide-ranging overhaul of the US financial regulations since the 
1930s. However, it is doubtful that this Act would have prevented the financial crisis. This is 
for two reasons. First, it is grounded on very shaky theoretical foundations, in view of the 
non-separation of commercial and investment entities. Secondly, the Act, as well as current 
proposals to reform the finance industry, do not challenge the homogeneity and hegemony of 
the group identities and related interests of the set of individuals who have dominated the 
finance industry for the last few decades. This means that the same social norms and practices 
used before 2007-2008 are likely to be maintained and sustained beyond the GC. This raises 
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serious doubt on the effectiveness of the Act and reforms of the financial sector. The rest of 
this Section discusses these two reasons, starting with a brief discussion of the shaky 
foundation theoretical foundations of financial reforms, before an analysis of how pre-
2007/2008 social norms are likely to be used and maintained in the decades to come. 
One of the major problems with the current approach to financial regulation is that it is 
grounded on a theoretical framework, namely the neoclassical theory of money that maintains 
the classical dichotomy between real and monetary sectors (Fontana 2010: Ch. 2). As long as 
money is considered a veil, and commercial banks are deemed to be intermediaries between 
savers and investors, financial crises can only be the outcome of external factors, like e.g. lax 
or fraudulent lending behavior by mortgage originators, lack of due diligence, if not conflicts 
of interest, by credit ratings agencies, or the unusually accommodative behavior of the Fed 
(the so-called Greenspan’s put). As a result the current approach to financial regulation is ad 
hoc, backward-looking and of a piecemeal nature. 
By contrast, in an endogenous money approach where money has the nature of a debit-credit 
relationship, commercial banks create ex-nihilo liquidity, and hence money is neutral neither 
in the short-run nor in the long-run (Graziani 2003), financial crises could be endogenously 
created by the normal workings of modern economies. The Financial Instability Hypothesis is 
a classic case in point (Minsky 1986). In an endogenous money approach, there is also a clear 
distinction between commercial banks and financial institutions (Fontana 2010: Ch. 5). The 
former create ex-nihilo liquidity by accommodating – at their own price - the demand for 
loans of credit-worthy firms and households. Banks thus convert illiquid claims of firms and 
households into liquid means of payment, namely sight deposits. Financial institutions collect 
existing liquidity from savers (usually with long-run horizons) and allocate it to investors 
(usually with short-run horizons). They therefore intermediate between savers and investors 
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that have different liquidity preferences. Thus, commercial banks as opposed to financial 
intermediaries can issue debts claims on themselves, namely sight deposits, which are 
accepted as final means of payment in the economy. This means that a sound approach to 
financial regulation should focus on the economic functions of the banking and financial 
system rather than on institutions or financial products (Kregel 2014, Kregel and 
Tonveronachi 2014). For this reason it is doubtful that the Dodd-Frank Act, which does not 
separate commercial banking from financial intermediaries (e.g. investment banks), would 
have prevented the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Progress on financial reform, though, is extremely slow. This slow progress can be explained 
– at least in part - by one of the main arguments of this contribution in that the social identity 
of the key players driving the financial reform process is responsible for it. In other words, 
the established set of economic ideals and social practices that were the common norm before 
2007-2008 have not been challenged by the financial crisis and the GC that followed it. This 
means that the same social norms and practices used before 2007-2008 are likely to be 
maintained and sustained in future years. For instance, the Group of Thirty, an international 
body of financiers and academics, heads or former heads of Central Banks and chaired by 
Jean-Claude Trichet published a report in 2013 calling for a new paradigm for financial 
institution boards and financial supervision (SteeringCommittee 2013). Yet, if “the new 
paradigm recognizes the shared interests of boards and supervisors” (ibid: 11) and the first 
new principle for boards is to “have members who have ongoing relationships with 
supervisors and who are versed in matters of interest to the supervisor” (ibid: 34), then it is 
highly probable that the demographics of the group responsible for financial decision-making 
stay homogenous beyond the crisis. As such the slow progress of reforms is in their group 
interests. The IMF managing director Christine Lagarde was right to argue at a recent 
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conference in London (‘Inclusive Capitalism’, 27 May 2014) that the finance industry is 
responsible for the lack of meaningful banking sector reforms in view of their worrying 
poverty of action. Indeed, the IMF director went on to argue, “the bad news is that progress is 
still too slow and the finish line is still too far off’. In fact, over five  years since the Dodd-
Frank Act of July 2010 the banking reform remains a work in progress not merely in the US 
but also across the world. 
Norm Sustainability beyond the Global Crisis 
The ethical values and economic interests driving the behaviour of the high-status/high-
earnings group have led to a movement of income away from the real sector and other 
groups, which is still the case several years after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Norm 
sustainability in the financial sector needs to be understood in terms of the convergence of 
interests at stake to consider its persistence over time. Weber (1905) provided the well-known 
argument linking materialism to the capitalist and protestant ethics as a source of financial 
success. The experience of financialisation in different countries has however been quite 
diverse (Lapavitsas and Powell 2013), which suggests that managerial and financial norms go 
beyond economic and religious values to include social identities. In effect, the masculinity 
(Knights and Tullberg 2012, Connell and Messerschmidt 2005), intersectionality (hooks 
1981, Nash 2008), stratification (Darity et al. 2006, Mason 1996) and feminist (Nelson 1992, 
Meyers 2005) literatures, have stressed the importance of social identities in influencing 
economic interactions, and in particular how it affects the movement of income between 
social groups.  
In the context of the financial sector, Knights and Tullberg (2012) have shown that the 
capitalist value of economic self-interest and particular masculine ideals such as risk-taking 
and authoritative action have merged in a way to sustain the norm of high-status/high 
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earnings leading to the Great Recession. If one considers Weber’s view to be applicable to 
the US, the managerial and financial behavioural norm of the Great Moderation is therefore 
at the intersection of capitalist, protestant, and masculine ideals which have led to the 
building of earning excesses. The literatures on intersectionality (hooks 1981, Nash 2008) 
and stratification (Darity et al. 2006, Mason 1996) in effect show that the cumulative effect of 
identities on the social stratification of modern economies can lead to worse outcomes than 
considering identities separately (Davis 2015). For instance, the intersectionality literature 
started as a critique of the early feminist movement considered to be biased towards white 
middle-class women and ignoring the experience of black women. Being at the intersection 
of the black and women groups, black women suffer from both sexism and racism in social 
and economic interactions. One of the insights of these literatures is to consider that an 
individual is at the intersection of heterogeneous identities with unequal power. As such, the 
outcome of cumulative identities with unequal power on inequality can be worse than the 
addition of equal identities. In the context of financialisation in the US, it meant that the 
cumulating effect of capitalist, protestant and masculine ideals has had an exponential rather 
than linear outcome on social stratification7. 
Norms and ethical behaviour in managerial and financial occupations are therefore to be 
understood in terms of the cumulative effect of heterogeneous identities with unequal power. 
For example, Van Staveren (2014) argues that gender ideals constraint women outside the top 
managerial roles in the financial sector and thus reinforce the existing strong masculine 
culture in place. She further argues that women being better at managing risk and uncertainty 
than men should have better access to top managerial positions. However, whether a higher 
proportion of women in the top managerial positions of financial institutions would have 
impacted on the likelihood to lead to financial excesses depends on the norm adopted in the 
context of this occupational group, and more generally on the institutional environment. For 
20 
 
instance, Prügl (2012) notes that risk-taking is a recent ‘masculine’ phenomenon in the 
financial sector, and that 20-30 years ago ‘masculinist’ banking was quite conservative and 
risk averse. In other words, masculinity is not a static phenomenon, and has been affected by 
(and in turn has influenced) the same features of the financialisation process that have led to 
the GC, including increasing inequality, financial liberalisation and deregulation. Cohn et al. 
(2014) in effect show that context matters in the banking profession, and that once in the 
context of this occupation, the economic self-interest takes over the interests of other 
identities. Therefore, access to top managerial position by heterogeneous identity groups 
would also lead to financial excesses as long as this prevailing norm is sustained over time. In 
2014, the enquiry of the US Senate on suspicion of influence over commodity prices by 
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley shows that rent-seeking behaviour in 
the financial profession is likely to be sustained over time.  
The demographic composition of board of directors influences their process of decision-
making. In an extensive review of the research on the human and social capital at the 
managerial level, Johnson et al. (2013) show that the diversity of human capital is beneficial 
for board decision-making processes (see also Page 2007) but that the way occupational, 
human, social diversities interact makes it difficult to assess the reasons behind this positive 
effect. Another research finding is that contextual effects are important on the firm outcomes, 
which thus add a cultural dimension to the factors influencing decision making at the board 
level. As they suggest, research should go beyond cross-industry analysis to account for the 
diversity of cultural, social, and human capital: “[d]oes a female director have more influence 
in France, the United Kingdom, or Japan? Does financial expertise vary in influence by 
country or industry? Does industry specific expertise vary based on country? Are there some 
characteristics that are “converging” in the way that some scholars argue some governance 
dimensions are more general?” (Johnson et al. 2013: 254). The intersection of cultural, social, 
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and economic norms at the board level seems to be a key element in determining the 
decisions of firms.  
  
Concluding Remarks  
Looking for a financially stable and sustainable behaviour, the lesson of both financialisation 
and stratification is that having one homogenous group at the top of the social and 
organisational hierarchy with the short-term view of pursuing its own self-interest 
undermines financial stability and sustainability of the society at large. Identity-related ideals 
are not at stake here if one considers each of these group identities separately, namely white, 
masculine, protestant, heterosexual, middle-age groups, etc.. Instead, major concerns arise 
when the intersection of identities creates an ideal that damage, not only the financial sector, 
but also the stability and sustainability of the real economy. Finding the right combination of 
ideals to sustain a stable financial behaviour therefore requires a better understanding of the 
long-term benefits of decision-making, its implications on others in the real sector, and the 
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1 Looking at debt statistics, between 1998 and 2002 outstanding household debt in the US was 76.7 percent to 
GDP; between 2003 and 2007 it shot to 97.6 percent of GDP. In the same periods, and in the UK case, 
household debt jumped from 72.0 percent of GDP to 94.3 percent of GDP. In the Euro Area household 
debt moved from 48.5 to 56.6, respectively. Also, over the period 1997 to 2007 the ratio of US 
financial sector debt to GDP rose by 52 percent. Similar numbers apply in the case of other developed 
countries, notably UK, Ireland, Spain. 
2 See, also, Epstein (2005), and Palley (2013). 
3 See Ortiz and Cummins (2013) for a comparative study of expenditures cuts in developing countries and its 
detrimental effects on children, women and pensioners. 
4 See Bauman (1972: 303). 
5 See, also, Folbre (2012) on how group identity and collective action based on gender, class, and age affect the 
distribution costs of developing human capital. 
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6 In addition to the Volcker rule, other regulatory schemes often discussed in the literature are the Liikanen 
subsidiarisation and the Vickers ring fencing. See Kregel and Tonveronachi (2014) for a critical 
discussion of all three regulatory schemes.   
7 See Arestis, Charles and Fontana (2014) and Philippon and Reshef (2012) for some empirical evidence on the 
exacerbation of financial earnings over time. 
